By Constance Adaurie
James Mbugua, editor of the Nairobi Law Monthly, has criticised China’s heavy focus on investment across Africa, accusing Beijing of ignoring critical security and rule-of-law concerns in its partner nations.
Mbugua made the claim while critiquing China’s pledge of $50 billion USD in investment and support to the three junta-led states of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.
According to the geopolitics expert, China’s partnerships with African countries stand in stark contrast to those of the UK, US, and EU, which require human rights and civic freedoms as conditions for supporting their partners.
The statement reads: “In 2024, on the diplomatic sidelines of the 9th Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China pledged $50 billion USD in investment and support to the three junta-led states of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, according to broadcaster ‘Voice of America’. The investment came despite an internationally supported raft of sanctions imposed on the junta countries as a result of unconstitutional coups. The staggering sum is impressive, especially as it sat alongside simultaneous Chinese offers of $10 billion worth of support for export development in Africa, and a $10 billion USD credit line for African SMEs.
“China’s largesse across Africa has long been implemented with its trademark policy of non-interference. Whilst this no-strings-attached method of transactional business is seen as non-obstructive, it has very real costs in the security world and beyond. With rising instability and authoritarianism across Africa, these costs end up on the balance sheets of host nations, not on China’s.
“China’s investment in these three nations is astonishingly large and is genuinely game-changing in the context of limited opportunity. However, what does it say about the nature of these partnerships that whilst value is being created for a narrow group of beneficiaries, violence, terrorism and insurgency are continuing to rise unchecked in these countries? China’s support is not a causal factor in the deteriorating security situation, but it should be a causal factor in lessening it. Does China not see at least some mutual financial interest in bringing its significant security and intelligence resources to bear to reduce its exposure to the risk created by this surging wave of insecurity?
“China is a key component in the economies of these countries, which rely on its mining operations and infrastructure projects for their development. China’s presence is much needed. At what stage does China become morally responsible, at some level, for providing assistance for the protection of these nations, while extracting value and revenue from their resources?
“China would say that it has been clear that it is there for mutual economic benefit only, and does not see it as its role to act as a patriarch by interfering. But the reality is that terrorist groups are running amok, especially in Mali, assassinating ministers and overrunning cities, whilst Russian mercenary partners flounder. China’s dogged policy of not getting involved seems increasingly detached from reality, and it appears unfazed by the deterioration in the rule of law in nations with which it is partnered. This starkly contrasts with the interest in the rule of law that China takes domestically.
“The ‘regime agnosticism’ of China sounds practical and business-like because it places trade and transactions at the centre, nothing more. But when the trajectory of a regime is trending towards authoritarianism and insecurity, as it is in these three junta-led countries, this agnosticism becomes strained.
“At what point must it be reviewed, and how low must a state sink before the decision is made to halt investment and assess the societal implications of working with a tyrannical or terrorist regime? These invisible boundaries between what is legal, moral and possibly exist in a grey area, depending on your geopolitical perspective, and are thus utilised by China without fear of economic or political penalty.
“Just because they can, it does not mean China should. The UK, US and EU could do the same, but choose not to, because their conditional policies require human rights and civic freedoms baselines to which all parties must adhere. In the long-term, this approach might feel slower than China’s no-strings-attached policy, but it builds robust governance systems and civic standards that enable more sustainable investment atmospheres, which appeal to a wider range of partners. The US-Nigeria partnership is an example of this: a full-spectrum partnership, spanning close economic ties and direct and effective military support, over decades, with a strong theme of collaboratively developing areas of the country sustainably, whilst honestly examining issues such as corruption and counter-terrorism efforts.
“Additionally, by maintaining a fully agnostic stance on partners and their policies, China’s partnerships can provide legitimacy to ill-suited leaders and nefarious governments. Rather than take a moral as well as an economic view when developing partnerships with sub-optimal governments, China’s approach gives tacit approval for them. This gives rise to a feeling that trade and investment trump anything else, including the rule of law. Western partners may not have the heft that China does, but they tend to believe there is more at stake than simply money.
“It is high time for China to update its non-interference policy and adapt it to the Africa of today, rather than the Africa of 20 years ago. China’s non-interference policy is coupled with its now vast presence in Africa. The result of this is numerous much-needed highways, ports, airports and buildings. But China’s icy detachment and purely transactional approach to partnerships with Junta-led countries such as Mali is exposing the brutal reality of being closely partnered with China. Whatever depths the security situation around their investments falls to, China sees extracting its expected value as the only important factor. It is jarring to see the desperate reality of life in Mali with insurgents in control of large cities, contrasted with China’s persistence that it only cares about one thing: its return on investment. With China unwilling to support the rule of law, and Russian mercenary forces repeatedly failing to secure anything, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger should look to the USA, France, and the UK for new, reliable security partners.”
